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and the Supreme Court-
the Latest Round 
by Prof. Jerold H. Israel* 
My first task is to explain to some degree the nature of the 
problem embodied in our title. This book has been desig-
nated as "Escobedo-The Second Round." What we will be dis-
cussing is a series of cases, decided in June, 1966, the most 
noteworthy of which is Miranda v. Arizona [384 U.S. 436 (1966)]. 
In these cases, the United States Supreme Court prescribed a 
new set of standards governing the introduction in evidence of 
statements obtained from the defendant through police interro-
gation. Actually, to a degree these standards were not entirely 
new. They had been suggested, at least in part, in the Escobedo 
decision in June, 1964 [Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 ( 1964 )]. 
In that respect the Miranda standards can properly be de-
scribed as "Escobedo-The Second Round." Really, however, 
the standards laid down go so far beyond those prescribed in 
Escobedo itself, that it is more accurate to describe this series 
of cases as "Miranda-The First Round" or, to be more ac-
curate, "Police Interrogation and the Supreme Court-The 
Latest Round." 
*Associate Professor, The University of Michigan Law School. 
15 
16 I SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
The various chapters will deal with several aspects of the 
second-round cases and the problems that they present. My 
responsibility basically is to provide a general background for 
the chapters that follow. It is to provide an over-view, a basic 
context for appreciating the points to be raised in subsequent 
presentations. Thus, I will attempt first to describe the back-
ground of the Miranda decision, second, to describe the de-
cision itself, and third, to raise in a general way some basic 
problems and ambiguities that are presented as a result of the 
decision. In this regard, I must say I am most fortunate be-
cause I have the opportunity simply to pose questions, but not 
the responsibility of answering them. I leave that for those who 
follow. 
Miranda's Holding 
In describing the general background of the "second round" 
cases, it perhaps is best to begin not at the beginning but at the 
end. It may be helpful in understanding how we came to Mir-
anda to know first something about what that decision itself 
holds. Actually, the Miranda decision deals with a series of 
four cases decided on June 13, 1966, in a single opinion: Mir-
anda v. Arizona, Vignera v. New York, Westover v. United 
States, and California v. Stewart. Since the Court issued only 
a single opinion covering the four cases, and the Miranda 
case was first mentioned in the masthead, the case is generally 
referred to as the Miranda decision. 
All four cases involved in the Miranda decision concerned 
violent crimes-rape, robbery, etc. In each case the defendant 
was arrested and taken to the police station where he was in-
terrogated. The interrogation lasted for various periods. In 
Miranda's own case, it lasted only two hours before the defen-
dant confessed. In another, Westover, the defendant was in-
terrogated by Kansas City police officers before being turned 
over to the F.B.I.; the state interrogation continued intermit-
tently over a fourteen-hour period. In each case a conf~ession 
was obtained and used in evidence to obtain a conviction. A di-
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vided Supreme Court found in each case that the admission of 
the confession was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantee of due process. The Miranda, Westover, and Vignera 
cases were decided on a 5-4 basis with the Chief Justice writing 
the opinion and Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan and Fortas 
concurring. Justices Harlan, White and Stewart dissented in 
all cases, and Justice Clark dissented in all except the Stewart 
case, which was decided by a 6-3 vote. 
The reasoning of the majority is summarized in the opinion 
itself: 
... [T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether 
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from ~custodial inter-· 
rogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege 
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we 
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As 
for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other 
fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons 
of their right of silence and to assure a continuous oppor-
tunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. 
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that 
he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does 
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he 
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained 
or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of 
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, know-
ingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any 
manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to 
consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no 
questioni~. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indi-
cates in any manner that he does not wish to be inter-
rogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact 
that he may have answered some questions or volunteered 
some statements on his own does not deprive him of the 
right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until 
he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents 
to be questioned. [384 U.S. at 444-45] 
The Court thus sets up certain standards to be followed in ob-
taining statements through custodial interrogation by police 
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officers. Custodial interrogation specifically is defined as "ques-
tioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has 
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom 
of action in any significant way." [384 U.S. at 444] There 
was no question in each of these cases that there had been cus-
todial interrogation, since the defendants clearly had been 
taken into custody prior to questioning. In such a situation, the 
Court held, :police officers must give the defendant four warn-
ings: First, the defendant must be told of his right to remain 
silent. Second, he must be told that anything that he says can 
be and will be used against him in court. Third, he must be 
told that he has a right to consult with an attorney prior to the 
interrogation and to have the attorney present during the in-
terrogation. Fourth, in this connection, he must be informed 
that if he cannot afford an attorney, an attorney will be ap-
pointed for him. Since these four warnings were not given prior 
to interrogation in the Miranda, Westover, Vignera and Stew-
art cases, the confessions obtained as result of that interroga-
tion were excluded from evidence as obtained in violation of the 
due process clause of the Constitution. It should be emphasized 
that I am, of course, referring here only to the majority opin-
ion. 
Development of the Doctrine 
Having described the holding of the Miranda case, perhaps 
we may now return to the beginning of our story, and consider 
how the Court came to this result. For, at first glance, what we 
see here appears to be rather strange indeed: a federal court, 
by a margin of one vote, sets up a detailed code of police inte:r:-
rogation practices, "enforced" by the exclusion of evidence ob-
tained in violation of those practices. 
One may ask, first, how a federal court could rea~h this po-
sition with respect to the operation of state and local police 
officers. The starting point in answering this question neces-
sarily is the Fourteenth Amendment. That amendment pro-
vides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law. It seems clear that this 
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language gives the Supreme Court, as the ultimate interpreter 
of the Constitution, the authority to determine what constitutes 
due process insofar as the states' operations in the criminal 
procedure arena are concerned. 
Actually, although the Fourteenth Amendment was passed 
shortly after the Civil War, it was not until many years later 
that the Court began to examine the basic operation of state 
criminal procedure. In fact, the first case involving police in-
terrogation on a constitutional level, so far as the states were 
concerned, was decided only in 1936. That case, Brown v. Mis-
sissippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), was an ideal beginning because 
its facts were as barbarous as could be imagined. 
In Brown it was alleged that the defendant's confession to 
murder had been obtained by what amounted to physical tor-
ture. While the nature of the physical abuse made it obvious, 
especially during the trying times of the late 1930's, that the 
Court would reverse the conviction obtained through use of 
the confession, it was not entirely clear exactly what basis 
would be found for the reversal. 
At first glance, it might appear that the Fifth Amendment 
would furnish the most appropriate ground, since it provides 
that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against him-
self in a criminal trial. But the Fifth Amendment presented 
two problems. First, the concept of compulsion as used in the 
Fifth Amendment was not considered to be applicable to the 
police because they had no legal authority to compel an ans-
wer, although it was quite clear that the torture in effect con-
stituted a very strong form of compulsion. Second, and prob-
ably of more pressing significance, only the Fourteenth 
Amendment applied to the states and not the Fifth, and the 
concept of due process in the Fourteenth Amendment had been 
restricted only to those rights deemed fundamental in a civilized 
society. Twenty years earlier, in Twining v. New Jersey 
[211 U.S. 78 ( 1908)], the Court had indicated that the privi-
lege was not itself a fundamental right that was absorbed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause and so made 
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applicable to the states. Therefore, the Brown decision had to 
be based on some ground other than the strict privilege against 
self-incrimination. 
The Court did in fact reverse Brown's conviction, but on the 
ground that the confession, because it had been obtained by 
torture, was not necessarily trustworthy, so that Brown had 
been deprived of a fair trial when his conviction was based on 
untrustworthy evidence. This ground clearly fitted within the 
"fundamental rights" interpretation of the due process clause, 
since it recognized that basic trial fairness was an essential 
attribute of due process. 
Between the decision in Brown in 1936 and the decision in 
Miranda in 1966, there was a steady stream of confessions 
cases that manifested a process of gradual development of doc-
trine. While the Court at first concerned itself with confes-
sions that were "coerced" through physical brutality, it soon 
began to reverse convictions based upon confessions obtained 
as a result of "psychological" coercion. Confessions obtained 
as result of threats and lengthy questioning, and in one case 
even through the use of a psychiatrist [Leyra v. Denno, 347 
U.S. 556 ( 1954 )], were found to be invalid. It was thus clear 
even ten years before Miranda that the key to the exclusion of 
confessions was no longer the issue of the trustworthiness of 
the confession. 
The Court clearly stated this in the Spano case in 1959 [Spano 
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 ( 1959)]. There, a close friend played 
upon the sympathy of the defendant and in this manner caused 
him to confess. In reversing the conviction based on the con-
fession, the Court stressed that its opinion was based not on lack 
of trustworthiness of the confession, but was instead tied to the 
impropriety of the police action in putting pressure upon an 
individual to make him testify against his will. With this point 
well established, the Supreme Court in a series of cases over 
the succeeding five years, in one instance after another, held 
the use of various techniques to constitute undue pressure re-
sulting in "involuntary" confessions. 
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Then, in 1964, the Court decided the Escobedo case. Esco-
bedo had been arrested on suspicion of homicide. His request 
to see his lawyer was denied. When his lawyer actually came 
to the stationhouse to see Escobedo, the lawyer's request to 
see his client was also denied. After four hours of interroga-
tion, Escobedo confessed. The Court in Escobedo did not rely 
on the "undue pressure" rationale of coerced confessions to re-
verse Escobedo's conviction. Instead, it approached the area 
of police interrogation along a new path-the right to counsel. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the assistance of counsel in 
all criminal cases. Prior to 1963 that amendment had not been 
held to be incorporated bodily into the Fourteenth Amendment. 
But in the now famous Gideon case [Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963)], the Court specifically held that the prin-
ciples encompassed in the Sixth Amendment were all funda-
mental without exception and therefore completely applicable 
to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment due process 
clause. Escobedo had not had the opportunity to consult with 
his lawyer and his lawyer with him. This in itself, the Court 
ruled, could require the exclusion of Escobedo's statement as 
obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
The holding, however, was limited to the specific facts 
of the Escobedo case. The Court specifically noted that this 
was a case where: ( 1 ) the investigation was no longer a gen-
eral inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus 
on a particular suspect, (2) the suspect had been taken into cus-
tody, (3) the police had carried out a process of interrogation 
that lent itself to eliciting incriminating statements, ( 4) the 
suspect had requested and been denied an opportunity to con-
sult with his lawyer, and (5) the police had not specifically 
warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain si-
lent. All this, the Court noted, added up to a denial of the as-
sistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment "as 
made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," which in turn required the exclusion of any statements 
elicited during the interrogation. 
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During the two years following Escobedo the state and lower 
federal courts placed varying interpretations on its holding. 
Some narrowly restricted the case to its facts, while others 
read it as broadly applicable even if the specific circumstances 
mentioned in Escobedo itself were not present. 
Departures from Escobedo 
The Miranda case was viewed before it was decided as the 
vehicle by which the Court would clarify the Escobedo de-
cision. In fact, Miranda turned out to be not a mere clarifica-
tion or even a modification. It cut a new path with new signposts, 
although it seems to go in the same general direction as the 
Escobedo case. There are various differences between the 
Escobedo and Miranda decisions that should be noted. 
First, the Miranda case rests on the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination as applied to the states under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than upon the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel. However, the Escobedo case, it should be 
noted, did mention the Fifth Amendment even though it was 
not based on that amendment. 
Second, the Miranda case speaks in terms of the presence of 
counsel during interrogation in order to protect the self-
incrimination privilege, whereas Escobedo is couched basi-
cally in terms of the right to consult with counsel prior to in-
terrogation. Also, while Escobedo was in terms of consultation 
with one's own lawyer, Miranda is in terms of the right of the 
person interrogated to the presence of his own counsel or, if 
he cannot afford counsel, of counsel appointed by the state. 
Third, Escobedo turned on the focus of the inquiry upon the 
accused as well as on the fact that the accused in that case had 
been in custody. The Miranda case rests strictly on the fact of 
custodial interrogation. The Court does define custodial inter-
rogation [384 U.S. at 444] as encompassing any situation in 
which an individual is taken in custody or "otherwise deprived 
of his freedom of action in any significant way." In offering 
this definition, the Court appends a footnote that this is what it 
had referred to when in Escobedo it spoke of an investigation 
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which had focused on an accused. While this may very well be 
what the Court did in fact refer to, it seems quite clear that the 
concept of a custodial interrogation might encompass far fewer 
situations than those within the concept of "focus on the ac-
cused." 
Fourth, it should be noted that Miranda purports to recog-
nize some legislative power to provide other devices to pro-
tect the privilege against self-incrimination. While it denomi-
nates the standards it imposes as constitutionally required, it 
notes that these are required in order to protect the basic privi-
lege against self-incrimination; the states may well find 
other means to further that protection [384 U.S. at 467]. The 
Escobedo case, in contrast, made no suggestion that there was 
any leeway in the specific requirements on interrogation that 
it imposed. 
The Opinion Dissected 
Having described the background of Miranda, and the points 
at which Miranda departs from the prior cases, it may be worth-
while to examine the opinion in greater detail. It is divided into 
five parts. The first two lay out the basic themes of the opin-
ion. The third sets up the rules that the Court will impose to 
govern police interrogation. The fourth justifies these rules, 
and the fifth applies them to the facts of the four cases before 
the Court. 
In Part One, the Court deals with the nature of the interroga-
tion process. It notes that all persons questioned by police are 
generally questioned in a room cut off from the outside world. 
It is quite clear throughout this section that the Court speaks 
in terms of police station, in-custody interrogation, although its 
eventual definition of "custodial interrogation" comprehends 
any restriction that might deprive a person of his freedom of 
action in any significant way, and thus appears to be much 
broader than stationhouse interrogation. The Court concludes 
that interrogation of this kind is inherently compulsive. It re-
lies on several police manuals describing police interrogation 
to emphasize the following factors: The interrogation is secret 
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and private. The police tend to display a persistence which 
wears the individual down. Frequently it is accompanied by 
deception; excuses are offered to encourage the man to tes-
tify. Sometimes the interrogators presume to offer legal ad-
vice and the individual is persuaded not to call upon an attor-
ney. The Court therefore concludes that these techniques in-
evitably lead to intimidation that in many cases trades on the 
weakness of the individual. 
This conclusion that police interrogation is inherently com-
pulsive is sharply attacked by the dissenters. The dissenters 
first question the Court's ability to obtain an accurate descrip-
tion of total police practice throughout the country on the basis 
of a few police manuals. They also question the accuracy of the 
Court's description of the impact of these techniques on crimi-
nal defendants. 
Having established that police interrogation is inherently 
compulsive, the Court next considers whether this compulsion 
violates the privilege against self-incrimination. The primary 
issue here is whether the privilege applies to police interroga-
tion. The argument was made that it did not because there was 
no legal compulsion to testify. It also had been argued, as I 
mentioned previously, that the Fifth Amendment privilege was 
not fundamental, and therefore did not apply to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court was able to re-
ject both contentions on the basis of various precedents. It cited 
in particular an early federal case, the Bram case [Bram v. 
United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897)], which applied the privilege 
to a confessions case. It noted further that in recent years, most 
notably in Escobedo and the Malloy case [Malloy v. Hogan, 
378 U.S. 1 ( 1964)], the Fifth Amendment had been held to be 
fundamental in all respects and thus applied to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. It concluded that the 
logic behind the Fifth Amendment privilege of self-incrimination 
was meant to apply to informal compulsion like that imposed 
through police interrogation. This conclusion was also a point 
of major contention by the dissents, which questioned the his-
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torical accuracy of the majority's conclusion that police inter-
rogation was within the purpose and function of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. 
Having established that the privilege did apply to police in-
terrogation, and that such interrogation had an inherent ten-
dency to violate that privilege, the Court then set forth various 
rules and regulations necessary to protect the privilege. In do-
ing so, however, the Court noted that the rules announced were 
not absolutes, but that in the absence of legislation they were 
to be applied. The Court stated in particular: 
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives 
for protecting the privilege which might be devised by 
Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative rule-
making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Con-
stitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular 
solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation 
process as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no 
way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will handi-
cap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this 
effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue 
their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of pro-
tecting the rights of the individual while promoting efficient 
enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are 
shown other procedures which are at least as effective in 
apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in 
assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the fol-
lowing safeguards must be observed. [384 U.S. at 467] 
The Court then proceeds to lay down the safeguards. The first 
is the warning of the fact that the individual has a privilege 
against self-incrimination. The Court emphasizes that this 
warning must be given in "clear and unequivocal terms." 
The reasons for requiring the warning are: ( 1 ) Some defendants 
may be unaware of the privilege. ( 2) Even if they are aware, 
it may be too difficult to determine on a case-by-case basis who 
was and who was not aware of his privilege. ( 3) Even though 
the person clearly was aware of his privilege the mere fact that 
the warning is given indicates an absence of pressure. This in 
turn tends to overcome the inherent pressure in the police in-
terrogation process by showing that the police recognize the 
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existence of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, 
and indicate their willingness to abide by his exercise of privilege. 
The Court then turns to its second required warning, that any-
thing the individual says can and will be used against him. This 
is obviously necessary in order to reinforce the warning that 
the individual has a privilege against self-incrimination. The 
Court is not entirely clear in its statement, however, as to ex-
actly in what form this warning should be given. At one point 
[384 U.S. at 469] it talks in terms of a statement that the evi-
dence "can and will" be used against the defendant. At another 
point the term used is that the evidence "may" be used against 
the defendant [384 U.S. at 444]. There is an obvious ambi-
guity here into which, I understand, we will go more thoroughly. 
The Court then turns to what may be the crux of the Miranda 
warnings. The individual must be told that he has the right to 
have counsel present and to consult with counsel. It is impor-
tant to emphasize that the Court here goes beyond Escobedo. 
There is no requirement that the individual initiate the request 
that he be given the opportunity to consult with counsel or to 
have counsel present. The offer must first be made by the 
police. The Court emphasizes that this is the only way to pro-
tect the right not to incriminate one's self. 
First, the warning of privilege may not itself be sufficient 
because the pressure inherent in the interrogation process may 
overcome the effect of that warning. Second, even prelimi-
nary discussions with counsel prior to interrogation may not be 
enough, as evidenced by the Escobedo case in which the de-
fendant actually had talked with his counsel before he was 
picked up for interrogation. Third, if the individual does decide 
to make a statement, counsel according to the Court can ensure 
an accurate statement. Finally, though this ground is not 
stressed by the Court, it is very clear that counsel will also 
serve as a witness to the making of the statement; he there-
fore serves as an outside third party who destroys the secrecy 
of the interrogation process. 
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The Court then goes on to make an obvious point. The rich 
defendant can obtain his own counsel, and therefore the indi-
gent defendant must have the same opportunity. He must be 
told that he can have appointed counsel and that no question-
ing will be done until counsel is appointed and present. This 
is based on the principle developed in a series of cases arising 
in Illinois, holding that a poor defendant should not have fewer 
procedural rights than the rich defendant, at least in terms of 
the functional effect of those rights. The Court emphasizes, 
however, that while the indigent is entitled to have a lawyer ap-
pointed if the police engage in interrogation, there is no auto-
matic requirement that a lawyer be appointed in any event. 
If the police do not engage in interrogation, the Court does not 
require them at this early a stage in the proceeding to obtain 
the appointment of counsel for the indigent. 
The Court then proceeds to discuss what must be done after 
the four warnings have been given [384 U.S. at 475-76]. It notes 
at the outset that if the defendant indicates "in any manner'' 
that he does not want to be interrogated, no interrogation can 
ensue. It further notes that even if the defendant starts to ans-
wer questions, interrogation must cease immediately, if he later 
stops answering or indicates that he would like to consult 
a lawyer at that point. I think, myself, that this is an additional 
point that could very well be included in the original warnings. 
Also, if the defendant indicates that he will answer questions, 
but first desires to see a lawyer, no questioning can of course 
be undertaken until the lawyer arrives and the defendant has 
had full opportunity to consult with him. If a lawyer is present, 
however, and the defendant asks not to make a statement, the 
Court indicates that possibly some questioning may still be 
done. This is a little developed aspect of the Escobedo decision 
which is noted in footnote 44 [384 U.S. at 474]. 
The opinion then turns to the very important issue of waiver, 
for of course if the defendant waives his right to consult with 
counsel, and his privilege against self-incrimination, his con-
fession may be admitted [384 U.S. at 478]. The issue there-
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fore arises as to what constitutes waiver. The Court notes at 
the outset that a heavy burden rests on the prosecution to 
prove waiver; the prosecution can best bear that burden 
because the facts are more readily available to it than to the 
defendant. It emphasizes that an express statement can con-
stitute waiver but that waiver will not be assumed from silence. 
Nor will waiver be assumed from a partial answer. The Court 
indicates also what problems may be presented in the waiver 
area. It suggests that if there is a lengthy interrogation or in-
communicado incarceration after the person has supposedly 
waived, there is a serious question about the voluntariness of 
the waiver. Also, any waiver obtained by trickery, threats 
or cajolery will not be viewed as voluntary. Finally, the Court 
turns to the consequences of a statement obtained after an in-
voluntary waiver, or resulting from a failure to give the warn-
ings or to respect the defendant's request to remain silent or 
have his lawyer present. 
The Court stresses that any statement obtained in violation 
of the defendant's rights must be excluded from evidence. This 
applies to any statement, whether it be a confession or an ad-
mission, and whether inculpatory or exculpatory. In other words, 
if the defendant says, "I didn't do it, X did it," or "I shot him but 
he shot first," his statement is as excludable from evidence as 
if he had confessed to commission of the whole crime, and to 
all its elements as well. 
The Court stresses, however, that there are limits to this ex-
clusionary rule; it applies, as do all the requirements in the 
opinion, only to statements obtained as a result of custodial 
interrogation. The majority points out, for example, that if a 
person should voluntarily enter a police station and state that 
he wishes to give a confession, the confession would be admis-
sible because voluntary. Furthermore, statements may be ad-
missible if they were the result of a general inquiry when the 
person was not under restraint. The Court emphasizes [384 U.S. 
at 4 77] that general on-the-scene questioning about facts sur-
rounding the crime is not prohibited by the Miranda holding. 
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Finally, in Part Four of the opinion, the Court tries to show 
that its ruling is consistent with efficient law enforcement. It 
stresses the importance of protecting individual rights, ques-
tions the need for the use of confessions in many cases, and 
stresses in particular that the F.B.I. has followed a practice 
very similar to that which it establishes. It also notes the Eng-
lish and Scottish experience with similar types of rules. This 
part of the majority opinion is subjected to a sharp dissent by 
Justice Clark who emphasizes that the F.B.I. did not in fact fol-
low a practice identical to Miranda; there were a number of 
important differences in the F.B.I. practice. In particular, as 
Justice Clark sees it, the F.B.I. traditionally informed the de-
fendant that he had a right to have counsel appointed by the 
judge, but did not state that they would not question him until 
that counsel was in fact appointed. Also, according to Justice 
Clark, the F.B.I. had always continued to question on matters 
other than the individual's guilt even after he had insisted that 
he wished to claim privilege against self-incrimination. I must 
say, as a side matter, that certainly on this issue, my limited 
conversations with F.B.I. officials suggest that Justice Clark 
more accurately describes past Bureau practices than does 
the majority opinion. 
The fifth section of the opinion is somewhat anticlimactic. 
Having established its rules concerning custodial interroga-
tion and having justified those rules historically and theoreti-· 
cally, the Court applies them to the facts of the cases before it. 
In all four situations before it, the Miranda requirements had 
of course not been complied with in their entirety, and the 
confessions were therefore excludable. 
Unresolved Problems 
Although the Miranda opinion is quite extensive and the Court 
more than once succinctly summarizes its rulings, the case is 
still not clear in all respects. Ambiguities lie in several points 
that the Court raises, and the Miranda rules also suggest new 
possibilities which were not presented to the Court in the Mir-
anda setting. I would like at this point to mention briefly some 
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of these issues, which will be dealt with in subsequent chapters. 
First, what is the nature of custodial interrogation empha-
sized by the Court? Although the cases before the court all in-
volved in-custody interrogation, the Court's definition extends 
much beyond that. The Court talks in terms of one who is de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Would 
this apply to a person who is stopped on the street? Would it 
apply to a person who is questioned at home? The Court notes 
that there is a different psychological impact if a person is 
questioned at home [384 U.S. at 449]. At a later point [384 
U.S. 478, note 46] it quotes a Scottish court that also noted the 
difference between questioning at home and in a police station. 
Would the answer depend upon the presence of other persons, or 
on whether there is more than one police officer involved in the 
questioning, or how the questioning was phrased, or on some-
thing besides these matters? Would the Court possibly accept 
the concept that there may be a continuum involved here? In 
other words, in some situations far removed from custodial 
interrogation no warning might be needed. In an instance of 
custodial interrogation, all the warnings must be given. Per-
haps, in areas that fall somewhere between, like on-the-street 
interrogation or at-home questioning, it might be necessary 
only to warn the individual beforehand against self-incrimina-
tion, but not necessary to warn him of his right to counsel, or 
perhaps to the appointment of counsel. In this regard, one ob-
vious factor of considerable significance will be the determi-
nation of what exactly is left of the "focus upon the individual 
suspect" concept of the Escobedo case. As I mentioned earlier, 
the Court indicated that its definition of custodial interrogation 
encompasses this concept [384 U.S. at 444, note 4]. 
Second, another question of utmost importance will concern 
the determination of waiver. What if a person refuses to sign a 
waiver form? Are there also some persons who because of their 
peculiar background or low intelligence are in such a condition 
that they may not waive their rights in the absence of a law-
yer? 
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Still a third question will be the means by which a lawyer 
will be obtained for the indigent. What of the delay involved in 
getting a lawyer? Will that have a bearing on the duty of prompt 
arraignment, especially in lightly-populated regions where con-
siderable delay may be involved? 
Fourth, what is the consequence of failure to give the Mir-
anda warnings? Does it merely require the exclusion of the 
confession, or does it also require the exclusion of any evidence 
obtained through leads furnished by the confession? This raises 
the issue as to whether the fruit of the poisonous tree doc-
trine is applicable to the ruling, a point discussed at length by 
Professor George and Justice Cohen. 
A fifth question concerns what remains of the right to coun-
sel concept of Escobedo. Does Escobedo continue to have any 
independent validity? For example, there are presently before 
the Court two cases involving a line-up in which the defendant 
insisted upon the right to consult with counsel before appearing 
in the line-up. Do these cases continue to pose some sort of 
Sixth Amendment problem, or could Escobedo now be looked 
upon as basically a Fifth Amendment case? In this regard, 
also, what if the defendant does not request to see his lawyer 
and indeed indicates that he would like to continue the dis-
cussion without a lawyer, but his lawyer requests the oppor-
tunity to see his client? In this context the New York case 
cited by the Court is of interest [384 U.S. at 465, footnote 35]. 
One other issue which may have relevance concerns the im-
pact of the Massiah case [Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 
201 (1964 )], which deals with application of the right to coun-
sel when a person is being interrogated after indictment by 
a person whom he does not realize to be in the employ of the 
police. Could the Massiah case now be looked upon as a Fifth 
Amendment self-incrimination case, and if so, could that Fifth 
Amendment concept be extended to the pre-indictment stage? 
I really have serious doubts about such an extension of the 
Massiah doctrine, but it should be noted that Miranda creates 
this possibility, though I do not consider it much more than 
that. 
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It should be emphasized that one of the major issues opened 
up by Miranda has already been settled. In the Johnson case, 
[Johnson v. New jersey, 384 U.S. 719 ( 1966)], the Court held 
that Miranda was not retroactive, but will apply only to cases 
that go to trial after June 13, 1966. A similar approach was 
adopted for the Escobedo case; its ruling will be applied only 
to cases tried after it was decided. The purpose of the Court in 
refusing to apply its decision retroactively is very clear. It is 
not equally clear, however, exactly why it chose the date of 
trial, rather than the date at which the confessions were ob-
tained. Apparently, the primary concern was that the prose-
cutor realized before going to trial that the confessions were 
not sufficient in themselves. I would think, however, an equally 
important factor might have been that the police officers at the 
time the confession was obtained before the Miranda ruling, could 
hardly have been expected to anticipate that ruling. 
Finally, the Miranda case may have some implications for 
other areas of criminal procedure. For example, I think it may 
reflect on the type of consent needed for a search. It may also 
be relevant with respect to the possible extension of other 
constitutional rights to the state defendants by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as was done with the Fifth Amendment 
self-incrimination rulings in the Miranda and Malloy cases. 
Also, the decision in Johnson as to retroactivity reempha-
sizes the fact that all new rulings by the Court in the criminal 
procedure area will be applied prospectively. The Court, by 
stating a broad rule in Miranda going beyond the facts of the 
particular case, may also be indicating that it will seek to es-
tablish broad rules in other areas of criminal procedure. 
